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Abstract:  The cost of the Canadian health care system is approximately 10% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Survey-evidence suggests that Canadians do not wish to have additional funds spent on 
health care but believe that the system should be able to deliver better quality care. Due to low fertility 
rates and increasing life expectancy, the Canadian population is aging. Over the next 25 years, the 
dependency ratio will increase, primarily due to the aging of the “baby boom generation”
 2. This will 
place twofold cost pressures on governments responsible for maintaining the health care system:  
•  As a consequence of increased life expectancy, on average, Canadians will have a longer period 
of health care consumption. Although age-specific cost may not increase, with an aging 
population aggregate annual health care expenditures are expected to increase. 
•  The dependency ratio is a proxy for the ability of the population to support itself. The 
increasing dependency rate may result in a slowdown in GDP growth, given constant 
technology. 
In Section I, this paper attempts to quantify these factors. A single measure combining cost and quality 
is developed to demonstrate the magnitude of the challenge.  
 
In Section II, this paper examines a number of different approaches to health care financing including 
user fees and alternative compensation methods for physicians. The paper highlights documented 
information from Canada and international experience on the implementation issues involved. The 
paper evaluates the desirability of implementing these approaches in Canada.  
 
Résumé:  Le coût du système de santé représente 10% du Produit Intérieur Brut (PIB) canadien. 
De récents sondages montrent que les citoyens ne sont pas en faveur d’une augmentation du budget de 
la santé mais sont toutefois de l’avis que le système en place devrait être en mesure d’assurer un service 
de meilleure qualité. En raison du faible taux de natalité et l’augmentation de l’espérance de vie, la 
population canadienne est vieillissante. Au cours des 25 prochaines années, le ratio de dépendance des 
personnes âgées va augmenter, principalement en raison du vieillissement  de la génération des “baby-
boomers”. Cette situation va placer une double pression budgétaire sur les gouvernements responsables 
du maintient du système de santé public: 
•  L’augmentation de l’espérance de vie moyenne  des canadiens va amener ceux-ci à bénéficier 
plus longtemps du système de santé. Même si, pour un âge donné, la consommation du service 
n’augmente pas, le vieillissement entraînera l’augmentation des dépenses totales annuelles en 
santé. 
•  Le ratio de dépendance est un indicateur de la capacité de la population à supporter le système. 
Le taux de dépendance grandissant pourrait résulter en un ralentissement de la croissance du 
PIB, en supposant un niveau de technologie constant.   
La première section de cet article tente de quantifier ces facteurs. Une mesure unique combinant les 
coûts et la qualité est développée dans le but de  démontrer l’ampleur du défi à relever.  
 
La seconde section de cet article examine différentes approches de financement du système de santé, 
incluant des frais d’utilisation et des méthodes alternatives de compensation des médecins. Cet article 
présente les informations documentées pertinentes des expériences canadiennes et internationales 
décrivant les problèmes liés à la mise en place de ces différentes mesures. Cet article évalue l’intérêt 




According to survey information published in October 2003, “rather than paying more to 
maintain or improve (health) care, Canadians are more supportive of innovative solutions 
and incentives for appropriate use - that work within or expand upon - the current  
system” (Pollara 2003).  The statement seems straightforward.  But what do Canadians 
mean by it and how should cost and quality of care be measured over time?  In Section I 
of this paper these questions are examined and a measure of dollars of health care 
expenditure per year of disability-adjusted life expectancy (DALE) is proposed. Using 
this measure and projections to 2031 of the Canadian population, cost of health care, and 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it is shown that, by maintaining health care costs per 
year of DALE at today’s level in real terms, after adjustment for population aging, health 
care costs as a percentage of GDP increase only modestly. These projections are 
dependent on growth of GDP, which is itself dependent on productivity growth. Section I 
concludes with a brief review of divergent views of various economists concerning 
productivity growth projections. 
 
In Section II of the paper, some of the challenges of maintaining health care costs at 
today’s level are examined, such as measures of efficiency of the current system, and 
alternative financing methods such as user fees and alternative compensation methods for 
physicians. This paper recommends that user fees not be implemented for universally-
mandated medically necessary services, primarily because of the inequitable burden 
placed on the less healthy, especially the less-healthy poor, but also for reasons of 
economic inefficiency.  The paper recognizes the cost-management incentives inherent in 
a capitation system for physician payment, acknowledges the need for gradual change in 
implementing such a system, but expresses skepticism concerning the likelihood of 
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SECTION I - HEALTH CARE COST PROJECTIONS 
 
Current Cost Of Health Care  
 
In 2002, total expenditures on health care in Canada were 9.6% of GDP (The Economist 
2005) or approximately $115 billion (Canadian). In 2003, total expenditures on health 
care in Canada had increased to 9.9% of GDP (The Economist 2006) or approximately 
$126 billion (Canadian). The survey results previously quoted may indicate that 
Canadians do not want to pay any more dollars in absolute terms for health care services 
of equivalent quality. Given that the future for Canada will include some inflation, an 
increasing, as well as an aging, population which will exert upward cost pressures, I shall 
interpret the survey results to indicate that Canadians do not wish to pay a greater share 
of GDP for health care services of equivalent quality.  
 
There is no universally accepted single measure of quality. Any single measure will 
emphasize certain aspects of care and exclude other aspects. One measure is life 
expectancy. The quality and comprehensiveness of the health care system may contribute 
to increasing life expectancy in a variety of aspects including: better prenatal and infant 
care reducing infant mortality rates; population-wide immunization programs reducing 
the risk of death due to tuberculosis, smallpox, etc.; adequate access to care by physicians 
and in hospitals, thereby prolonging life. Such a measure does not include any measure of 
responsiveness, as would say a measure which incorporated length of waiting time for 
service, nor does it include any measure of equality of access to care which may vary for 
those in rural areas or for native peoples, nor does it include a measure of effectiveness of 
treatment except to the extent that ineffective treatment affects mortality. 
 
A measure of quality used by the World Health Organization that is more encompassing 
than life expectancy is disability-adjusted life expectancy. DALE corresponds to the 
number of years of life expectancy free of disability plus a fraction of the years of life 
expectancy during disability calculated using weights assigned to various states between 
death and perfect health (WHO 2000); as such DALE is less than life expectancy. The 
difference between DALE and life expectancy is approximately seven years. Both 
absolutely and relatively this difference is due to lower disability rates in richer low-
mortality sub regions of the world, further widening the health status gap between richer 
and poorer nations. For the purposes of this paper, DALE is used to measure quality by 
making a deduction of seven years from life expectancy (except as noted later when 
examining the impact of health status improvement).  Page   4
In order to combine cost and quality into a single composite measure, Quality-Adjusted 
Health Expenditure (QAHE), is defined. QAHE is the health expenditure in U.S. dollars 
per capita per year of DALE, using exchange rates to convert currencies.  Also calculated 
is a Quality-Adjusted Health Expenditure Index (QAHE Index) that is based on QAHE 
but which uses a measure of purchasing power parity rather than exchange rates to 
convert currencies, and then converts to an index using the U.S. as 100. QAHE and the 
QAHE Index are complex measures including health care expenditure converted to U.S. 
dollars divided by a measure of quality being DALE. The ranking order and the annual 
change for specific countries are of greater interest than the absolute value.  However, a 
high QAHE or a high QAHE Index rating produces an undesirable ranking.  
 
Table 1 shows the rankings of the top ten developed countries in descending order of 
QAHE, calculated using 2002 health expenditures. It also shows QAHE, QAHE Index, 
these countries’ health expenditure as a percent of local GDP and where these countries 
would rank internationally on this measure, and the countries’ DALE in years and their 
rank based on DALE. QAHE ordering does not change the position of the USA and 
Switzerland, first and second respectively, from their position when the traditional 
ranking of health expenditure as a percent of GDP in local currency is used. However, the 
expenditure gap between the USA, Switzerland and Norway when measured by QAHE in 
USD, the difference between 76.6 and 67.2 and 64.4 respectively, does not seem as great 
as it does when measured as a percentage of local GDP, the difference between 14.6% 
and 11.2% and 9.6% respectively. Canada ranks tied fifth-sixth in health care 
expenditures as a percentage of local GDP but drops to eighth in QAHE in USD, 
indicating that if DALE is the measure of quality, Canada is getting relatively good value 
for its expenditures. It is interesting to observe how Japan and the Scandinavian countries 
rise in the rankings when QAHE rather than health care expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP is used as the measure. Japan is especially interesting. It has a relatively low rank in 
terms of health care expenditure as a percentage of local GDP, tied fifteenth-sixteenth, 
and a world leading DALE; yet due to its relatively strong currency, it ranks ninth in 
QAHE in USD. Norway, Denmark and Sweden are ranked 3, 4 and 6 respectively based 
on QAHE, up from 5/6, 11 and 9 respectively when cost as a percent of local GDP is 
used. The change in position can be explained by the large relative purchasing power of 
their currency and in Denmark’s case, by its relatively low DALE. There is some change 
in relative positions when the QAHE Index is used for ranking. Switzerland assumes the 
(undesirable) first position, Denmark drops to 6 and Canada to 10. 
  































DALE  Rank 
by 
DALE 
1 USA  76.64  100.0  14.6 1  70.9  17 
2 Switzerland  67.21 102.7  11.2  2  74.1  2 
3 Norway  64.40  83.7 9.6  5/6  73.2  8 
4 Denmark  48.87 77.5  8.8  11 70.8  18 
5 Germany  43.90 78.4 10.9  3  72.3  12 
6 Sweden  42.23  77.8 9.2  9 73.8  4 
7 France  38.78  69.1 9.7  4 73.1  9 
8 Canada  35.43  58.1 9.6  5/6  73.7  5 
9  Japan 35.09 60.7  7.9  15/16  75.7 1 
10 Australia  34.06 58.3  9.5  7  74.0  3 
 
Source: The Economist Pocket World in Figures 2006 Edition, calculations by author 
 
To provide further international comparisons, Table 1A shows QAHE and QAHE Index 
based on both the 2002 health expenditures and 2003 health expenditures for selected 
countries. Countries are ordered by descending QAHE based on 2002 health 
expenditures. 






QAHE and QAHE Index For Selected Countries 
 
Country  QAHE (based 
on 2002 health 
expenditures) 
QAHE Index 




on 2003 health 
expenditures) 
QAHE Index 
(based on 2003 
health 
expenditures) 
USA  76.64 100.0 84.48 100.0 
Switzerland  67.21 102.7 77.08 109.5 
Norway  64.40 83.7 76.53 93.5 
Denmark 48.87 77.5 56.82 79.2 
Germany 43.90 78.4 50.99 81.8 
Sweden  42.23 77.8 49.56 78.7 
France  38.78 69.1 46.80 75.1 
Canada  35.43 58.1 41.45 62.3 
Japan  35.09 60.7 37.68 60.5 
Australia 34.06 58.3 41.13 63.7 
UK  32.38 57.6 39.74 60.5 
Finland  31.39 56.3 36.61 57.4 
Italy  29.52 54.2 33.40 55.7 
New  Zealand  23.79 54.8 28.20 56.6 
Singapore  12.76 26.0 15.43 25.8 
South Africa  8.35  40.6  10.69  44.9 
Chile  3.72 18.7 5.01 21.7 
Brazil  3.35 22.0 3.90 22.3 
Russia  3.19 17.6 3.89 18.4 
China  0.96 9.5 1.25  10.0 
India  0.59 10.1 0.53  7.9 
Source: The Economist Pocket World in Figures 2006 Edition and 2007 Edition, calculations by author 
 
 
It is interesting to note that in most countries the QAHE Index increased when based on 
2003 expenditures compared to 2002 expenditures, exceptions being Japan, Singapore 
and India (and the U.S. due to the method of construction of the Index). This indicates Page   7
that their QAHE based on purchasing power parity is deteriorating faster then the QAHE 
of the U.S. It is also interesting to note that the four economies that are expected to be 
part of the top six based on GDP by 2040, due to their expected rapid growth, Brazil, 
Russia, India and China, the so-called BRIC group, have extremely low QAHE and 
QAHE Indices. Will they be able to retain this favourable position as GDP increases 
significantly or will health care expenditures grow, especially when measured in terms of 
purchasing power parity? 
 
 
Projected Canadian Health Care Costs - 2031 
 
Due to comparatively high rates of fertility in Canada after World War ІІ followed by a 
significant decline in the 1970’s and subsequently; in combination with mortality rate 
improvements, Canada has a large demographic cohort born between 1946 and 1965, 
commonly referred to as the baby-boomers. As this cohort grows older and the ratio of 
dependants to employed persons increases, it is anticipated that its demands for 
retirement income and health care will place a significant burden on the Canadian 
financial system for two reasons: 
1.  the large size of this cohort will increase public expenditures on retirement 
income and health care absolutely; and 
 
2.  the costs of retirement payments and health care expenditures for this cohort will 
be borne by taxes and contributions made primarily by employed persons. 
 
This paper examines the effect of population aging on health care expenditures
3. Using 
the assumptions and methods described in Appendix A, the effect on health care costs of 
changing demographics is summarized in Table 2.  To estimate health care expenditures 
by age-sex range, the “basic health factors” from The Health of Canadians – The Federal 
Role, Volume Six: Recommendations for Reform in respect of a basket of 57 common 
primary care services were used (with adjustment as described below for the various 
scenarios). 
1.  these factors are applied to the 2005 and 2031 population projections to determine 
the expected change in health care costs due solely to demographic changes 
2.  to illustrate the impact of improving health status, the basic health factors are 
modified by assuming that the factors for ages 15 – 19 apply also at ages 20 – 24 
and all other higher age factors are shifted to the next higher age range 
3.  to illustrate the impact of improving health status when the adjustment to life 
expectancy for DALE is assumed to be 5 years (instead of 7 years), the basic Page   8
health factors in scenario 2 are modified by assuming that the factors for ages 45 – 
49 apply also at ages 50 -54 and all other higher age factors are shifted to the next 
higher age range 
It is assumed that health care costs by age-sex range remain the same as in 2005. Three 
different population growth scenarios are shown: low growth, medium growth, and high 
growth (columns 3, 4, 5 in Table 2). From Table 2 it can be seen that while the senior 
dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of those aged 65 and over to those aged 15 - 64 
(which is considered to be the working age group), increases by as much as 126%, the 
health expenditure factor increases at most by only 12.7%. (Compare lines 5 and 7 in the 
table). Nonetheless, health expenditures can be expected to increase due to shifting age-
sex population distribution, by 9.8% to 12.7% depending on the assumption regarding 
population growth. (See line 7 in the table).  
TABLE 2 
Demographic And Health Care Expenditure Ratios 2005 And 2031 
 






(1) Percentage of Population 0-14  17.6  13.1  14.2  15.9 
(2) Percentage of Population 15-64  69.3  62.5  60.1  61.6 
(3) Percentage of Population 65 and 
over 
13.1  24.4 25.7 22.5 
(4) Senior Dependency Ratio {(3)/(2)}  .189  .390  .428  .360 
(5) Percentage Increase Over 2005 in 
Senior Dependency Ratio 
0 106  126  93 
(6) Health Care Expenditure Factor for 
Population 
1.039  1.171 1.154 1.141 
(7) Percentage Increase Over 2005 in 
Health Care Expenditure Factor for 
Population in 2031 
0 12.7 11.1  9.8 
(8) Health Care Expenditure Factor 
With Health Status Improvement for 
Population in 2031 
1.039  1.078 1.064 1.053 
(9) Percentage Increase Over 2005 in 
Health Care Expenditure with Health 
Status Improvement for Population in 
2031 
0  3.8 2.4 1.3 
 
Brown and Suresh (2004), among others, have suggested that one aspect of increased life 
expectancy is a general improvement in health status and that might have the effect of 
postponing health care costs.  The last two lines of Table 2 (compared to lines (6) and 
(7)) illustrate the relative moderation in health cost increases, when health care costs are Page   9
adjusted in order to model the improvement in health status that may accompany 
increased life expectancy. Although there remains an increase in total health expenditure 
factor, the increase is small. 
 
The final component in comparing projected health care expenditures in 2031 to health 
care costs in 2005 is to project GDP for 2031 and convert projected expenditures to a 
percentage of GDP. For this exercise GDP per employed person for 2005 is multiplied by 
the projected number of employed persons in 2031 and by a growth in GDP factor to 
account for productivity growth over the 26-year period. Two annual productivity growth 
factors are used: 1.36% which represents the average annual growth in GDP per hour 
from 1981 - 2003 and 1% to illustrate a slower rate of annual productivity growth. It is 
further assumed that the basic cost of health care per DALE remains at the 2005 level, to 
reflect the message in the survey quotation that Canadians do not want to pay more for 
comparable quality. However, the basic cost is adjusted for changes in the health 
expenditure factor due to changing age-sex distribution. The results of these calculations 
are summarized in Table 3. Also shown in the last line of Table 3 is the projected impact 
if health status were improved and, as a consequence, the deduction to life expectancy to 
obtain DALE reduced from 7 years to 5 years. It is interesting to note that with a 1% 
annual productivity growth rate and no change to the health expenditure factors, the 
projected costs remain at approximately at the 2005 level of 9.6% of GDP. However, on 
this projection there has been an increase in average DALE of over 3 years, or 
approximately 4.5%, from 73.7 in 2005 to 77.0 in 2031. At annual productivity growth 
rates greater than 1%, such as 1.36%, the health care costs in 2031, as a percentage of 
GDP, are lower than 2005 levels, on all of the population growth projections, and are 
accompanied by a quality improvement as measured by an increased DALE. Hence, if 
Canada is able to keep its basic rate of health expenditures per DALE at current levels, 
before adjustment for changing demographic factors, provided the average annual rate of 
GDP growth is at least 1%, Canada’s level of health care expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP is projected to be at today’s level or below in 2031.  
 
 





Projected Health Care Expenditure In 2031 
As A Percentage of GDP 
 
  Population Projection 
  Low  Medium  High 
Assumption / Annual Productivity Rate   1.36%  1%  1.36%  1%  1.36% 1% 
No change to health expenditure factors  8.81  9.66  8.75  9.60  8.71  9.56 
Lag on health expenditure factors DALE 
adjustment 7 years 
8.11 8.90  8.07 8.85  8.04 8.82 
Lag in health expenditure factors DALE 
adjustment 5 years 
7.89 8.65  7.85 8.62  7.84 8.59 
 
Other Writers’ Analyses 
 
The outcome of the foregoing analysis is somewhat surprising in view of the projected 
increases in the senior dependency ratios. In this subsection, certain other writers’ 
analyses are reviewed. 
 
Evans et al. (2001) would not be surprised. They warn against “apocalyptic 
demography”, i.e., predicting skyrocketing health care costs based on increasing 
demographic dependency ratios. By analyzing the B.C. linked health data set they find 
that changes in the age structure of the overall population have not in the past been major 
contributors to trends in the per capita utilization of health care services. 
 
Denton and Spencer ( 1999) observe that it is important to recognize that population 
change affects not only the demand side of the economy, but also the supply side.
 In fact, 
in the projections in Part A of this paper, it is the rate of growth of GDP, “the supply 
side”, which outpaces projected growth in health care expenditures, to indicate that health 
care expenditures as a percentage of GDP, may decline from today’s level. Denton and 
Spencer conclude that when projected expenditures are compared to the projected Page   11
productive capacity of the economy, it seems likely that the total expenditures for all 
budgeting categories combined will be a smaller percentage of GDP in 2031 than in 
1991, even though there will be large increases in expenditures on health care and social 
security. 
 
So their conclusions are consistent with projections in this paper, even though they used 
projections to 2031 from 1991 whereas this paper’s projections to 2031 are on based on 
more recent 2005 data. 
 
On the other side of the issue, Robson (2001) warns that demographic changes will exert 
steady pressure on health care budgets and concludes that the baby boomers present a 
sizeable challenge to the sustainability of Canada’s health care system. 
How can such divergent views be reconciled? Without access to each writer’s model and 
its inherent assumptions, any reconciliation by this author is impossible. Two critical 
assumptions in any modeling exercise are: 
1.  the assumed rate of productivity growth; and  
 
2.  the assumed rate of growth in health care costs by age-sex range. 
 
A comprehensive review of the factors affecting productivity growth and the 
appropriateness of each individual author’s assumption of productivity growth is beyond 
the scope of this paper
4. However, before concluding Section I, several comments are 
listed in the next subsection which identifies certain aspects to be considered in 
developing an appropriate productivity assumption. In Section II, certain aspects of health 




Considerations Regarding the Productivity Growth Assumption 
 
With respect to an annual productivity growth rate, Robson (2001) uses 1.6% and he 
notes that increases in real output per person of working age have averaged 1.6 percent 
annually since 1980. Denton and Spencer (2003), in a follow-up paper, consider it a 
reasonable assumption that the annual rate of increase in labour productivity remains the 
same as in the decade 1991-2001, 1.61 percent.
  Sharpe (2005) summarizes the average 
annual rates of growth assumed by various sources showing the rates range from 1.2% for 
real GDP per hour assumed by Centre for Spatial Economics (2005), 1.6% for real GDP Page   12
per worker assumed by both Infometrica (2006) and Conference Board of Canada, and 
1.7 % for real GDP per worker assumed by Finance Canada (2006) and University of 
Toronto (2006). 
 
Denton and Spencer (2003) observe that GDP is equal to the product of the population, 
the proportion of the population regarded as the source from which the labour force is 
drawn, the overall labour force participation rate, the employment rate (or 1 minus the 
unemployment rate), and aggregate productivity, represented by output per person 
employed.  
 
Sharpe (2005) summarizes these components in a slightly different manner, stating that 
labour productivity growth can be decomposed into two components, changes in capital 
intensity and changes in multi-factor productivity.  
 
How some of these factors may change with an aging population is matter of conjecture. 
However, it is likely that there will be slower labour force growth. In this paper’s 
projections, the labour force only grows, in total, from 2005 to 2031, by 1.5%, 8.4 % and 
15.3% corresponding to low, middle and high growth scenarios. With slowing in the 
growth in the labour force, real wage rates may rise, making investments in capital more 
economical. Sharpe (2005) notes that greater capital intensity could contribute to more 
rapid labour productivity growth. Moreover, higher wage rates may lead to greater 
investment in human capital, for example, through increased education and training. The 
2001 Canadian Census confirms the trend to higher education and marks the first time 
that the majority of the working age population had post-secondary education (Statistics 
Canada 2003). The World Health Report 1999 (WHO 1999) states that life expectancy at 
birth alone is one of the strongest explanatory variables of growth in GDP, and that the 
relationship between health improvement variables and economic growth is sufficiently 
significant in the long term to justify sustained national commitment to investing in 
health. By this account, improving life expectancy and health status, which may be 
present in an aging population, could contribute to strong GDP growth.  
 
Robson and Guillemette (2003) observe that the beneficial life-time effects of better 
nutrition and preventative medicine in youth and the continuing improvements to medical 
technology seem likely to lead to continued improvements in the health status of the older 
population with a concomitant potential for increases in its participation in the workforce. 
Moreover, Canadians have made striking improvements in educational attainment, which 
is related directly to labour force participation increases. Page   13
 
On the other hand, Robson and Guillemette (2003) raise a number of concerns regarding 
productivity growth due to population aging. They anticipate that an older population will 
save less, and savings are thought to contribute to productivity growth. Moreover, they 
speculate that an aging workforce will be less productive. They point to
 studies which 
found that labour-force members in their sixties are markedly less productive than other 
workers implying that an increasing population of actual and potential workers in their 
sixties would depress aggregate productivity.
  
 
There is no clear consensus of what the future rates of productivity growth and GDP 
growth will be, nor will all the factors affecting these growth rates operate in the same 
direction.  The cost projections in this Part A are encouraging but they are heavily 
dependent on many assumptions, a very important one being the rate of growth of GDP. 
Two further assumptions implicit in this model are that there will be no change in service 
intensity and that productivity increases can be affected equally easily regardless of 
industry. These assumptions are questionable, for reasons identified in a related paper 
analyzing health cost projections (Andrews 2006), namely:  
1.  there is reason to suspect that there will be demands for increases in service 
intensity as the baby boomers age because boomers have come to expect quick 
and high-quality delivery for other goods and services and may demand the same 
for health care services; and  
 
2.  because productivity gains are normally shared with workers in the form of 
increased wages and/or improved benefits, an aging population of workers and 
former workers might result in benefit costs, including notably defined benefit 
pension plan costs, continuing to increase as a percentage of wages. 
 
In summary, there is no consensus as to what the impact of an aging population will be 
on productivity growth rates. Productivity growth is a key component of GDP growth. 
The results of Section I are encouraging because they show that, given the specified 
assumptions regarding health expenditure, increases in life expectancy and GDP growth, 
health care expenditures in 2031 will be at or below the 2005 levels, as a percentage of 
GDP. Nevertheless, the results are dependent on the assumed rates of GDP growth. In the 
absence of definitive studies demonstrating the impact of an aging population on 
productivity growth rates, the results of this Section I should be viewed with a prudent 
degree of caution.Page   14
SECTION II - DEMAND MANAGEMENT THROUGH FINANCING 
ALTERNATIVES 
 
Health System Performance 
 
A significant assumption underlying the calculations in Section I is that the cost per 
DALE can be maintained at the 2005 level. Note that by comparing QAHE based on 
2003 expenditures to QAHE based on 2002 expenditures in Table 1A, it can be seen that 
the cost per DALE for Canada increased by 17%
5 and that Canada is not alone in 
showing QAHE increases. There are many factors which may place pressure on costs 
such as technology innovation and implementation, redefinition of medically necessary 
services, demands for quicker access to service or for greater service intensity, higher 
wages in part due to slower labour force growth, need to replace infrastructure, etc., and 
different ones of these factors may play a more significant role in any given year. In this 
part, an evaluation of the cost performance of the Canadian health care system is 
presented to help understand the potential for cost maintenance or improvement. Next the 
paper examines alternative financing methods to limit excess demand, defined as being 
demand for care beyond what is deemed medically necessary, on the assumption that 
there may be excess demand. Excess demand may arise from actions of both patients and 
providers. 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has undertaken a performance ranking of the 
health care systems in 191 countries (WHO 2000). Based on a survey of 1006 
respondents from 125 countries, of which half were from among its own staff, the WHO 
established a system of weights as follows: 50% for the category “health” as measured by 
DALE, 25% for the category “responsiveness”, 25% for the category “fair financial 
contributions”.  Table 4 shows the performance ranking for the countries listed in Table 
1, both in respect of total health and overall health system performance. Evans et al 
(2000) used the same data but focused on performance in terms of achieving the goal of 
improving health measured in terms of DALE. 
 Their definition of efficiency reflects not 
only whether health programs and interventions are produced at the lowest possible cost 
(i.e. technical efficiency), but also whether the health system chooses to provide the most 
cost-effective set of programs or interventions for the given level of expenditure.
6 They 
use statistical methods to produce uncertainty intervals for the WHO Performance Rank 
on level of health, as shown in the last column of Table 4. Based on overlaps in these 
uncertainty intervals, this author has regrouped the ten countries into groupings A, B, C, 
D. Given Canada’s placement in group C, with a ranking of 35 on level of health and 30 Page   15
on overall health system performance, it is safe to conclude that the Canadian health care 
system is not achieving its level of DALE as cost-effectively as possible. 
 
TABLE 4 
Health System Performance 
 
 
From these data and analyses, it is not possible to estimate how much more efficient 
Canada could become. In an analysis of the equity and funding of the Australian health 
services, Peacock and Segal (1999) identify the following factors, which militate against 
system efficiency in Australia: 
•  fragmentation of services with involvement of multiple levels of government;  
•  urban and rural populations and vast sparsely inhabited regions; 
•  aboriginal people and the gross disparity in the health status of this group 
compared to the rest of the population; and  
•  role of the private sector and specifically a two-tiered health system underpinned 
by a large private health insurance market which supports differential access to 
services.  
 
Canada is very close to (just slightly ahead of) Australia in the efficiency rankings. The 
first three features listed above characterize the Canadian health care system. The first 
two may be considered structural characteristics that arise in respect of the British North 
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America Act and our geography. Because they are structural, they are unlikely to change. 
Concerted action could be taken to address the health status of native peoples, as such 
this component is not truly structural; however, given the length of time that this disparity 
has persisted and the complexity of the change management issues faced in trying to 
change it, this characteristic might be considered “quasi-structural”. As such, the native 
peoples’ disparity in health status is unlikely to change significantly in the short term. 
Canada does not have a two-tier system for medically necessary services as Australia 
does. This may be part of the explanation regarding why Canada is slightly higher in the 
efficiency rankings than Australia. In this regard, it is worth noting the following results 
from a 2005 Canadian health care survey (Pollara 2005) based on telephone interviews 
with nationally representative samples of 1,207 members of the Canadian public, 203 
doctors, 201 nurses, 202 pharmacists, and 201 managers and trustees, which suggest that 
Canadians may be becoming more open to the idea of a parallel insurance system for 
medically necessary care: 
•  “45% of the public, 49% of nurses, 48% of managers, 72% of pharmacists and 
73% of physicians support the idea that Canadians should be allowed to pay out 
of pocket to purchase faster access to health services that are currently funded 
under the public system. 
 
•  When asked whether they would personally be willing to pay out of pocket to 
purchase faster access to health services that are currently funded under the 
public system, support came from 49% of the public, 60 % of nurses, 63% of 
managers, 74% of physicians, and 76% of pharmacists. 
 
•  57% of Canadians believe allowing the purchase of private insurance for 
health care services already covered under the public health system would have 
either no impact or a positive impact on the Canadian health system”.  
 
Given the analysis of Peacock and Segal, there is a need to inform Canadians about the 
impact of private parallel care on efficiency of the health system. Based on their analysis 
of the dynamics of a parallel private system in Australia, Hurley et al. (2001) warn that 
the potential for cost savings is limited, waiting times are unlikely to be reduced in the 
publicly financed system, and the existence of the private parallel system will affect the 
operation of the public system. We turn now to considerations of excess demand.  
 
Excess demand is a slippery topic to address precisely. To begin, a definition of 
medically necessary services is required. Different countries, cultures and economies will Page   17
likely arrive at different conclusions regarding what services, if any, are to be available 
on an (at least partially) publicly-funded basis, if a physician or other qualified provider 
deems them necessary to treat a patient. Hence, two aspects of a medically necessary 
service are a determination by society that the service should be (at least partially) 
publicly funded and the determination by an accredited provider that it is necessary. 
However, it does not follow that all services that are (at least partially) publicly funded 
and are recommended by an accredited provider are necessary. To be necessary, it must 
satisfy a need of the patient; i.e., there must be an effective treatment for the condition 
from which the patient is suffering. If there is no effective treatment, then a service 
recommended by an accredited provider should not be considered medically necessary. 
But there are other complications, what if the individual’s condition has not been 
diagnosed or the individual has declined to accept the diagnosis. Surely that does not 
mean that no medically necessary service is required. Moreover, if there is more than one 
method to treat a condition and one treatment is more expensive than the other, could 
both treatments be medically necessary, or is only the least expensive treatment medically 
necessary, or are there other considerations
7? Before examining arguments regarding cost 
sharing, some comments regarding supplier-induced demand are presented. 
 
Supplier-Induced Demand (SID) 
 
Although patients typically identify a demand, i.e., they recognize that they have a 
condition which may require treatment, but whether treatment is required and performed 
and the type and extent of treatment are typically determined by the provider
8.  Two 
separate aspects of the reliance placed by patients on the health care provider make it 
likely that the patient will adopt the treatment plan prescribed by the provider.  
1.  Information asymmetry, or imperfect information, meaning that patients seldom 
are in a position to critically evaluate the provider’s diagnosis, or the likely 
effectiveness of the treatment plan or alternative options; and 
2.   An agency relationship, meaning the patient trusts the physician to act in the 
patient’s best interest in making the diagnosis and prescribing treatment, for a 
variety of reasons including licensing and the medical profession’s code of ethics. 
Consequently, there is a relatively small likelihood that the patient will not pursue the 
treatment plan as prescribed.  
 
In theory, SID occurs if a provider recommends a course of treatment that is not 
medically necessary and which would not have been accepted by the patient if the patient 
had all the relevant information (and the necessary time and ability to understand and Page   18
assess such information); for example, if the provider recommends services that are not 
strictly medically necessary or that are more expensive than other treatments with the 
same degree of effectiveness or if the provider increases service intensity, such as by 
seeing the patient longer, requesting more frequent follow-up visits, or requesting a wider 
array of tests and if a fully informed patient would not have chosen such services. In 
practice, for a variety of reasons, it is difficult to establish the existence of SID; one 
practical reason being the inability to determine what the fully informed patient would 
have chosen. Nonetheless, there is a significant body of literature which purports to 
document the existence of SID, such as the following:   
•  A Japanese study of treatment of heart attack patients found that increases in the 
relative number of hospitals and physicians are significantly related to physician-
initiated expenditures and the effect is higher for high-tech treatments and that 
physicians respond to more competition by generating greater demand for their 
services by increasing outputs, under Japan’s fixed reimbursement system. 
(Noguchi et al 2005) 
 
•  A panel data study of French physicians providing ambulatory care who faced an 
increase in the number of physicians per capita found strong support for the 
existence of SID and noted that physicians counter balance the fall in number of 
consultations by an increase in the volume of care delivered in each encounter.
  
(Delattre and Dormont 2002) 
 
•  A study of primary care physicians in Quebec found that physicians are sensitive 
to financial considerations and in order to defend their income, they are prepared 
to adjust both quantitatively and qualitatively their choice of consultation type. 
(Nassiri and Rochaix 2006) 
 
While there is strong evidence to support the view that SID does occur, there remains 
room for doubt. Where studies show physicians increase the quantity of service there is 
still room to argue that perhaps a medical purpose was served or that alternative treatment 
plans were specified due to lack of information regarding the effectiveness of specific 
treatments or ambiguity regarding the diagnosis. Moreover, the observed differences in 
demand are in respect of hypothesized supply and demand curves, and there remains the 
possibility these hypothesized curves were, in practice, misspecified. This is especially 
true with respect to health care services where the patient is unlikely to have sufficient 
information or the ability to assess available information concerning treatment plans and 
outcomes. In fact, even the physicians may be uncertain about alternative treatment plans Page   19
and outcomes
 (Mooney 1994). Also, the studies of SID do not all reach the same 
conclusion. 
 
•  A Norwegian study of physician services in respect of physicians who were under 
contract or were salaried found that neither of these two groups of physicians 
increased their output as a response to an increase in physician density
 and did not 
find evidence of SID for primary physician services in Norway (Grytten and 
Sorensen 2001).
 A possible explanation for this finding is that when physicians 
are remunerated by salary or are under contract income would not decrease even 
if utilization declined, so there would be no incentive for SID. 
 
•  A study by Dranove and Wehner (1994) casts doubt on the reliability of the 
statistical methods used by some studies which find evidence of SID. Using 
childbirths, an area of care where inducement should not exist, they find 
‘evidence’ of inducement of childbirths, calling into question the validity of the 
two stage least squares regression analysis approach. 
 
Although the existence of the SID cannot be established categorically, there is evidence 
to suggest that it is likely to exist in certain situations, for the following reasons: 
•  Physicians are human beings and are likely to trade-off work and leisure activities 
at various incomes levels. Brown and Lapan (1979) found evidence that the 
physicians’ labour supply curve is backward-bending. As such, it is likely that 
physicians place value on income and leisure and make trade-offs between the 
two and furthermore, physicians may have income objectives to support their 
style of living. 
 
•  When their income objectives are threatened, a not unreasonable human 
behavioural response is to attempt to protect that income. On reviewing Colorado 
experience between 1976 and 1978 regarding a reimbursement schedule change 
that was different for urban and rural physicians, Rice (1983) found that declining 
reimbursement rates result in the provision of more highly intensive services; 
increasing reimbursement rates result in provision of less highly intensive 
services.  Such findings are highly supportive of the demand inducement 
hypothesis. 
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•  Due to information asymmetry and the agency relationship, physicians are in a 
position to induce demand. There are various studies, some of which have been 




If cost reduction for public health care provision is the objective, a possible policy 
response is the introduction of some type of user cost-sharing, e.g., user fees, for services 
such as physician and hospital services that are provided currently under the provincial 
health care plans without direct charge to the patient. In the absence of any change in 
utilization, such a policy action would not reduce aggregate cost but it would create cost-
shifting to patients, and perhaps their private insurance providers, reducing the cost borne 
by the public health plans. However, an argument may be made that there is likely 
“excess demand” i.e., demand for care that is not medically necessary, so that utilization 
would likely reduce as a result of introducing user cost-sharing; thus, aggregate cost of 
health care would be reduced. This section explains this argument and then examines it 
critically. It concludes that the introduction of user cost-sharing is unlikely to reduce cost 
in aggregate, will result in cost shifting, will change the mix of services and patients 
being served which will adversely affect the poor, and in the long term is likely to result 
in an overall decline in health status when measured across the entire population. 
 
An argument for a reduction in costs due to introduction of user cost-sharing might be 
made as follows: 
•  In a perfectly competitive market where users paid the fair price for health care 
services and services were available to satisfy any level of demand, the level of 
services consumed would depend on the users’ demand schedule. An equilibrium 
would be reached at the quantity and price where the marginal benefit of the last 
unit of service consumed equals the marginal cost of that last unit of service.  
 
•  By introducing insurance, or provincial health plans, the out-of-pocket price of 
services to the user is reduced to zero. At this price a much larger level of services 
would be consumed, which results in a societal ‘welfare loss’ under the 
conventional model because people purchase services with marginal benefit far 
below the cost of these services
 (Rice 1998). Moreover, when services are 
virtually free to the user
9, a problem of moral hazard arises, i.e., there is no 
constraint on the user to consume services in a responsible manner and as a 
consequence waste results, e.g. through use of excessive services such as multiple Page   21
physician visits for minor illnesses or inappropriate use of services such as visits 
to emergency rooms rather than visiting a physician’s office for non-emergency 
treatment advice. 
 
•  Introducing a user coinsurance-charge provided it is not fully covered by private 
insurance raises the effective cost of services to the user above zero. It is argued 
that this will not only reduce the quantity of services demanded but also will act to 
curb some waste of services that would otherwise have been consumed due to 
moral hazard.  
 
•  Hence it is argued that introducing user coinsurance-charges for certain services 
previously fully paid for by the provincial plan will reduce wastage resulting from 
moral hazard.  By reducing utilization, costs will be reduced. 
 
This argument is based on standard microeconomic analysis in a perfectly competitive 
market. Such analysis may not apply. Consider the following: 
•  With the exception of a few people such as hypochondriacs, individuals do not 
demand health care, other than preventative care, unless they are ill. People seek 
health and as long as they are healthy, they do not demand health care; demand 
for health care is derived demand. As such, it is questionable whether the 
availability of health care, without fee to the user, will result in people consuming 
unnecessary health care services. Since excessive health care services cannot be 
resold by the recipient and may not be of any benefit to the consumer, the extent 
of moral hazard postulated is likely overstated. 
 
•  Two separate aspects of the patient’s reliance on the health care provider, namely 
information asymmetry and agency (explained in the previous subsection), reduce 
the likelihood that user coinsurance-charges will reduce utilization. Information 
asymmetry, or imperfect information, means that patients seldom are in a position 
to critically evaluate the provider’s diagnosis, or the likely effectiveness of the 
treatment plan or alternative options. Moreover, because of the principal-agent 
relationship the patient believes the provider is acting in the patient’s best interest 
in making the diagnosis and prescribing treatment. Consequently, there is a 
relatively small likelihood that the patient will not pursue the treatment plan as 
prescribed, even though the patient must pay a user coinsurance charge.  
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The random Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) (Manning et al 1987) estimated 
price elasticities for all care of .17 - .22 depending on coinsurance rate. Where 
demand is quite inelastic, the introduction of coinsurance will have little effect on 
utilization. Furthermore, an inelastic demand schedule has a steeper slope which 
means that the associated welfare loss due to the provision of zero-price services 
is less.  Rice (1998) observes that where there is evidence that cost sharing did 
reduce utilization, patients are as likely to forego effective medical services…as 
they are to forego less effective care. 
 
•  A recent study regarding the introduction of co-payments for doctor visits in 
Germany by Augurzky et al. (2006) concluded that the introduction of the co-
payments did not have a significant effect on the probability of visiting a doctor 




The foregoing discussion suggests that the introduction of user coinsurance-charges is 
unlikely to have a significant impact on utilization and, therefore, on cost in aggregate. 
The following paragraphs present arguments as to why the introduction of user 
coinsurance-charges would be a poor policy decision in the long-term. 
•  The HIE (Manning et al 1987) did find evidence that demand elasticities for 
medical care are nonzero and indeed that the response to cost sharing is nontrivial. 
One area where the demand for care was quite elastic when coinsurance increased 
was well care episodes, defined as medically deferrable care without great loss 
and can occur when the patient is not considered sick where price elasticity 
increased from .14 when coinsurance was in the range 0% - 25% to .43 when 
coinsurance was in the range 25% - 95%. Advocates for coinsurance charges 
might cite this is an illustration of how utilization can be changed to reduce cost. 
However, the well care episodes are not unnecessary services, merely deferrable 
ones. Hence, in the longer term the service needs to be performed. One cannot 
assess from these data whether if care is deferred for too long there may be other 
(more) costly services required. 
 
The HIE found that there was an income effect, with those of low income being 
affected most. For poor adults who began the experiment with high blood 
pressure, there was a clinically significant reduction in blood pressure in the free 
fee-for-service plan compared to plans with cost sharing and the magnitude of this 
reduction would lower mortality about 10 percent each year among this group. In Page   23
other words, health status among poor adults was negatively affected by (the 
change in care received due to having to pay) a coinsurance charge.  
 
•  Similar results were found in the Indonesian Resource Mobilization Study (WHO 
1999) which examined the effect of changes in prices of publicly provided health 
services on labour force participation. The great majority of those where prices 
had been raised showed at least some ill effects, but the effects were much greater 
among the poor, among men over 40, and among women in households with low 
economic and educational status. A follow-up study showed significant declines 
in labour force participation among the more vulnerable groups: labour force 
participation for women with no education fell 14%; women over 40 were also 
likely to have high dropout rates from the labour market in the areas where health 
costs had gone up; and age rates for men were also affected. The comparative 
slippage in the test areas was particularly great for older workers, whose health is 
presumably a greater factor in their work performance. 
 
In terms of the cost measure proposed in this paper, reductions in life expectancy are 
a cost attribute to be considered in assessing any proposed changes to the health care 
system. Moreover, from the discussion on factors affecting GDP and productivity 
growth, work force participation is important. The results of these studies would have 
a doubly negative impact on QAHE, affecting both GDP growth and DALE. 
 
The primary focus of this section is on cost-sharing (and its disadvantages). The previous 
subsection contained a lengthy discussion of SID, which will now be incorporated in this 
discussion. If cost-sharing were introduced and if it were to result in an initial drop in 
utilization, would such a drop be permanent?  
 
With a fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement system of physicians’ services, a permanent 
drop in utilization would result in a decrease in physicians’ incomes. Evidence seems to 
support the view that some physicians would attempt to prevent a decrease in their 
income and one way to do this would be by inducing demand.  If (some) physicians 
respond this way, total costs for services will not be reduced to the extent anticipated, 
since costs of services are directly related to physicians’ income. However, some of the 
(induced) services delivered will be less than medically necessary and of questionable 
benefit. Moreover, those receiving services will be those willing and able to pay the 
coinsurance fees. The poor who are unhealthy may be discouraged from seeking 
medically necessary care which they consider unaffordable. Furthermore, if as a result of Page   24
an initial (slight) decline in utilization associated with the introduction of a coinsurance, 
(some) physicians are available to supply services, it is likely that there will quickly be a 
demand for the physicians’ services, albeit to deliver services that may not be strictly 
medically necessary. On this scenario, introduction of coinsurance does not reduce the 
overall cost of care provided but does result in a less beneficial and economically 
inefficient mix of services being delivered and in a reduction in services to the less-
healthy poor. Accordingly, cost-sharing for medically necessary services does not appear 
to be an appropriate policy option to control costs. 
 
Alternative Physician Reimbursement Models 
 
If one accepts that there is SID, one may reasonably ask how it may be controlled or 
eliminated. Given the earlier claim that SID is not an unreasonable human behaviour, one 
direction of promise is to find a physician-reimbursement method which does not 
encourage or reward such behaviour. Table 5 shows a comparison of attributes of four 
alternative methods of physician compensation: salary, capitation, FFS, and case-based. 
The first line in the table shows that under salary and FFS, physicians have low 
incentives to keep costs down; but, under capitation and case-based compensation  
methods, the incentives to keep costs down are high. Lines 2 and 3 in Table 5 show that 
under FFS there are appropriate incentives to deliver high quality services; whereas, 
under the other compensation methods, the incentives to deliver quality services are 
limited. Line 5 shows that patients can exercise the greatest choice of caregiver under 
FFS, which is frequently identified as a desirable attribute of FFS. 
 
With salary compensation, physician compensation is determined in advance without 
reference to services provided or patients treated.  There is no connection between 
compensation and cost-effective treatment. As previously discussed, FFS compensation 
directly links delivery of services to physicians’ income, which rewards the delivery of 
services whether they are cost-effective or not. Capitation compensation arrangements tie 
physician compensation to a roster of enrolled patients. The capitation payment is 
determined in advance (and may be adjusted to reflect demographics and geographical 
factors) and does not depend on treatments delivered (although it may be reduced if 
enrolled members seek treatment from other physicians). Effectively the physician’s 
income is determined in advance, regardless of whether any services are rendered, so 
there is no compensation incentive to render services, especially ones that are not 
medically necessary (except perhaps the incentive to offer services that will prevent the 
requirement of more complicated and time-consuming treatment in the future). Case-
based compensation plans categorize treatments by case-type, so that reimbursement is in Page   25
respect to the case, based on pre-determined formulae, regardless of the number of 
services actually rendered to provide treatment. As such there is no incentive to 
recommend treatments that are not medically necessary. However, evidence of “case 
creep” has been observed, i.e., the tendency of physicians or of hospitals to categorize 
cases at a more serious, complex case level which is subject to higher reimbursement 




Comparison of Attributes of Alternative Methods of PhysicianCompensation 
 
  Methods of Physician Compensation 
Attribute Assessed Salary Capitation Fee-for-service Case-based 
Physicians have appropriate 
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Source: summarizing material in (Chawla et al 1997) 
 
 
Let us examine some of the advantages and disadvantages of the capitation system. Of 
the four methods of physician compensation, it appears best-suited to eliminate SID and 
it is being introduced, in certain circumstances, by Ontario and a number of provinces. 
Some of the advantages are: Page   26
•  The cost of care can be readily determined in advance. One knows the number of 
units (i.e., enrolled patients), and their relevant characteristics, on which 
compensation is to be based, and once the capitation rate is set, the costs are 
established. 
 
•  Since physicians are not incented to provide services that are not medically 
necessary, they may be more inclined to provide a better mix of services, which is 
more beneficial to society and more economically efficient, e.g. more preventative 
and fewer curative services. 
 
•  Since physicians’ incomes are based on their roster of patients, they will wish to 
maintain the number enrolled. However, if patient care is neglected in a current 
year, it can have adverse implications subsequently, for the physician’s income, 
such as by having the patient cease enrollment or by having the patient become 
more seriously ill later requiring more intensive treatment. Hence, there is an 
incentive for the physician to provide preventative medicine, nutritional 
counseling, health education, etc. Such services in turn may reduce the overall 
burden on the health care system. 
 
Some of the disadvantages include: 
•  It places all the risk for patient care on the physician. Although average cost per 
capita for the whole population may show a relatively small annual variation, 
when costs are examined for smaller rosters of patients, the variations will be 
more significant. Newhouse et al (1997) state that it appears that only about 20 – 
25 percent of the variance in actual annual spending can be explained 
prospectively through knowledge of an individual’s health and health spending in 
the prior few years, the remaining variance is, by definition, random. 
 
•  Faced with the risks described above, physicians may try to enroll only those 
patients whom the physician anticipates is likely to have lower service 
requirements than the capitation payment. This results in “cream skimming” and 
the potential exclusion of certain patients, such as the chronically ill. 
 
•  Since the physician is not compensated for services delivered, the physician may 
under-serve the patients such as by delaying appointments, shortening length of 
visits, prescribing drugs in lieu of more physician-intensive treatment. This may Page   27
be detrimental to the health status of patients and may increase the health costs to 
the system (but not necessarily the physician) at a later date. 
 
•  Not all services can be covered by capitation, e.g., emergency treatment and 
certain surgeries, so the model does not stand on its own. Moreover, it can 
become complicated to administer and potentially unfair if the patient seeks 
services from other physicians and a system of charge backs, or negation, is 
imposed. 
 
Ontario and a number of other provinces are moving toward reform of delivery of 
primary care services incorporating a capitation compensation component. Some positive 
aspects of this reform are the formation of provider care groups or networks able to 
provide some form of care on a 24/7 basis, accompanied by a standard [guarantee] of 
access to care. Aggregations of providers, instead of sole practitioners, are also better 
able to bear the risk of adverse fluctuations in medical care costs relative to the annual 
capitation payments. Moreover, these care groups will be staffed by physicians, nurses 
and other professionals which should provide for a better matching of the skills of the 
professionals delivering care to the skills required, which should increase economic 
efficiency. 
  
At this stage, implementation is primarily voluntary. Providers are forming groups and 
creating patient rosters. The province is providing financial support to subsidize the costs 
associated with group formation. Hurley et al (1999) endorse an approach allowing 
gradual implementation starting with those most eager to adopt the new approach and 
with the services that are best understood.
 This advice to implement gradually is 
warranted. When changing compensation methods substantially for physicians 
throughout the province it is likely that some physicians’ incomes will be reduced 
(because it is highly unlikely that for each physician, the payment for services actually 
rendered on a FFS basis in the prior year will exactly correspond to the aggregate 
capitation income in respect of the physician’s enrolled patients in the year of switch-
over). As previously mentioned, experience in Colorado which Rice has described 
provides a warning of the behavioural response that may accompany any (perceived) 
reduction in income.  
 
However, voluntary implementation is unlikely to be successful in achieving the desired 
cost savings. With voluntary enrollment, there is an incentive to enroll the individuals in 
better health and exclude or dis-enroll those in poor health or with chronic conditions. Page   28
Moreover, the capitation system will be most effective in controlling costs if the 
physician groups are able to act as gatekeepers. This is best accomplished if all patients 
are enrolled with a physician group and if the patient must attend his or her physician 
group first when seeking care, except in permissible exceptional circumstances, as is the 
case in the UK National Health Service
 (Hausman and Le Grand 1999). With a voluntary 
system where not all patients are enrolled, such control is not possible. 
 
Furthermore, not all services can be suitably compensated on a capitation basis. 
Hutchison et al (1999) recommend that for enrolled populations, capitation funding be 
blended with other funding streams.
 While it is easy to agree that blended funding may be 
more appropriate, it adds significant complexity and accompanying administrative cost. 
Is such complexity and expense warranted?  
 
In a previous subsection, it was argued that SID exists and that FFS provides an incentive 
for SID. However, what has not been established is the cost to the system of SID. 
Grignon et al (2002) concluded that Canada does not appear to have a serious problem of 
controlling health care costs. That being the case, is it worth disrupting the current 
system? Many physicians enjoy and are accustomed to the FFS model of private practice. 
Changing their compensation method may have an adverse impact on their incentive to 
work. For example, Gaynor and Gertler (1995) state that changing the method of 
physician payment from fee-for-service to capitation will dramatically reduce physician 
effort.
  Moreover, requiring physicians to work in groups with other professionals will 
create new dynamics and in some cases will provide incentives to free ride. Discussing 
the organization of General Practitioners (GPs) into Primary Care Groups (PCG) in the 
UK, Hausman and Le Grand (1999) observe that PCGs are unlikely to bring about 
appreciable savings in administrative costs and that it seems likely that there will be 




In conclusion, the changes, to create primary care groups which will provide 24/7 care by 
employing a broader mix of professionals, are laudable because they should improve the 
responsiveness of the system and achieve greater economic efficiency. However, these 
outcomes are achievable without implementing a system of capitation. As noted above, 
capitation places the financial burden of random annual variance in costs on the 
physicians, and this variance is significant. Faced with such financial risks it is reasonable 
to expect a behavioural response from physicians and the market place, such as cream 
skimming, dis-enrollment of less healthy patients, higher fees for practice insurance. Page   29
Capitation
11 might be used at a province-wide level to determine the prospective funds 
available for services, where the annual variance in cost can be borne by all physicians or 
shared with the (taxpayers in the) province; however I suggest that services be delivered 
on a FFS or salary basis, with volume modifiers. As Mooney (1994) notes, there are 
alternative fee structures that could be used. Permitting physicians and their medical 
associations to develop fee structures within an overall budget determined on a province-
wide capitation basis is more likely to avoid undesirable behavioural responses.  
 
In the manner in which capitation is being introduced with primary care reform, in 
Ontario and many other provinces, gradually and without complete (mandatory) 
participation, it is unlikely to achieve fully its cost reduction objectives, due to cream-
skimming, dis-enrollment of the chronically ill, etc.; however, it may carry a heavy cost 
associated with addressing behavioural reactions such as reduced work incentives or 
“workarounds” through cream-skimming, dis-enrollment, etc. In this author’s view, the 
anticipated cost savings will not compensate for the costs associated with the behavioural 
responses to the disruption of the system. Capitation, using this approach to 
implementation, would be better avoided. Page   30
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has shown that if costs per DALE can be maintained at 2005 levels, then on 
the basis of various assumptions regarding GDP growth, regardless of the population 
distribution in 2031, health care costs as a percentage of GDP will be at or below the 
level of 2005. An important component of GDP growth is productivity growth. There is 
no consensus on the level of productivity growth to expect or on the impact on 
productivity that an aging population may have. 
 
The paper shows that Canada’s health care system is not as efficient as it could be, either 
absolutely or relative to other countries. However, there are certain structural 
characteristics that may limit Canada’s ability to become more efficient, namely, the 
sharing of responsibility for health care among governments, Canada’s vast sparsely 
inhabited areas, and the need for special treatment of Canada’s native people. 
 
The paper describes the adverse consequences of implementing cost-sharing for 
medically necessary services in any attempt to control costs and reduce excess demand. It 
recommends against the implementation of cost-sharing. 
 
It is likely that supplier-induced demand (SID) exists. Its elimination would make the 
system more economically efficient. However, the implementation of a capitation system 
of physician reimbursement as a response to SID may face too many implementation 
issues for it to achieve its objectives without creating adverse consequences, such as 
behavioural responses by physicians to work less. 
 
In summary, the Canadian system is not perfect from an efficiency perspective. Changing 
demographics will impose cost pressures on the system; hence, it will be important to 
maintain cost control. However, with appropriate cost control in combination with 
reasonable growth in GDP, the cost of health care as a consequence of changing 
demographics is affordable. The prospect of demographic change should not be used as 
an excuse to shock the system with dramatic cost control measures.    
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APPENDIX A - MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODS 
 
Population Data – from Statistics Canada Catalogue No. 91-520-XIE – July 1, 2005 
population projection as the starting point and 3 population projections for 2031 
representing low growth (Scenario 1), medium growth (Scenario 2), and high growth 
(Scenario 6). Population growth is dependent on assumptions regarding fertility, 
mortality and net migration. A summary of key assumptions made by Statistics Canada 
follows: 
Component  Low Growth  Medium Growth  High Growth 
Fertility  1.3 children/woman  1.5 children/woman 1.7  children/woman 
Male life expectancy  81.1 years  81.9 years  82.6 years 
Female life expectancy  85.3 years  86.0 years  86.6 years 
Immigration rate  5.5 per 1,000  7.0 per 1,000  8.5 per 1,000 
Emigration rate  1.5 per 1,000  1.5 per 1,000  1.5 per 1,000 
 
Employment Rates – from Statistics Canada Catalogue No. 71-001-XIE – these rates are 
applied to the population data for age ranges 15 – 64 to estimate the size of the employed 
labour force. It is assumed that the same employment rates by age-sex will apply in 2031. 
 
GDP – figures from The Economist Pocket World in Figures 2006 Edition and 2007 
Edition 
-  Current GDP per employed person for is calculated 
-  GDP in 2031 is calculated by applying a constant annual rate of GDP growth 
to the current GDP per employed person assumed to occur in 2005, and 
multiplying by the projected number of employed persons in 2031. Two 
constant annual rates of GDP growth are used:  
1.  1.36% which is the historical average annual rate of productivity 
growth in the total Canadian economy, as measured by GDP per hour, 
for the period 1981 – 2003, as quoted by Andrew Sharpe in Future 
Productivity Growth in Canada and Implications for the Canada 
Pension Plan, p. 16 
2.  1% to illustrate a lower growth assumption (selected by the author) 
 
DALE – projected life expectancy from Statistics Canada Catalogue No. 91-520-XIE 
reduced by 7 years, a relationship identified by the World Health organization (or 5 years 
in the scenario of health improvements resulting in increased DALE) 
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Health Costs – (a) the “basic health factors” by age-sex range are from The Health of 
Canadians – The Federal Role Volume Six: Recommendations for Reform, p. 83, and 
represent the age-sex factors applied for payment for rostered patients in respect of a 
basket of 57 common primary care services 
1.  these factors are applied to the 2005 and 2031 population projections to 
determine the expected change in health care costs due solely to demographic 
changes 
2.  to illustrate the impact of improving health status, the factors are modified by 
repeating the factors for ages 15 – 19 for ages 20 – 24 and shifting all other 
higher age factors to the next higher age range 
3.  to illustrate the impact of improving health status when the adjustment to life 
expectancy for DALE is assumed to be 5 years, the factors in 2. are modified 
by repeating the factors for ages 45 – 49 for ages 50 -54 and shifting all other 
higher age factors to the next higher age range 
 
(b) the 2002 health care costs of 9.6% of GDP are from The Economist Pocket World of 
Figures 2006 Edition and the 2003 health care costs of 9.9% are from The Economist 
Pocket World of Figures 2007 Edition. This figure is converted to an average cost per 
DALE. The health care costs in 2031 are projected as the average cost per DALE in 2005 
multiplied by the ratio of average “basic health factor” for 2031 to 2005 multiplied by the 
projected aggregate DALE for the population in 2031. This figure is divided by projected 
2031 GDP to provide projected health costs in 2031 as a percentage of GDP. 
 
(c) it is assumed that there is no change in relative purchasing power for health care 
services between 2005 and 2031. The measures of purchasing power parity of GDP per 
capita in U.S. dollars are from The Economist Pocket World of Figures 2006 Edition and 
2007 Edition. 
 
Quality-adjusted Health Expenditure (QAHE) – calculated as health care expenditure 
per capita in U.S. dollars using exchange rates, divided by DALE per capita. 
 
Quality-adjusted Health Expenditure Index (QAHE Index) – calculated as health care 
expenditure per capita in U.S. dollars using a purchasing power parity measure, divided 
by DALE per capita, then converted to an Index by taking the U.S. as 100. Page   33
END NOTES 
 
1.  A version of this paper was prepared for a reading course in health economics under the 
supervision of Dr. Lori Curtis in summer 2006. The author wishes to thank Dr. Curtis for her 
guidance and also to thank Professor Robert L. Brown for his suggestions on reading the paper. 
An earlier version was presented to the Actuarial Research Conference in Montreal, Canada in 
August 2006. A version of this paper was presented to the International Actuarial Association 
Health Section Colloquium, held in Cape Town, South Africa, in May 2007 and has been 
published in the proceedings of that meeting. 
 
2.  The baby-boom generation in Canada is considered to be those born between 1946 and 1965, 
although some writers end it at 1964.  
 
3.  For a discussion of the projected impact of the baby-boomers on retirement costs, see, for 
example. Andrews, Doug, The Impact Of The Equity Risk Premium and Population Aging On 
The Canadian Retirement Savings System. 
 
4.  The assumed rate of growth in health care costs by age-sex range is also beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
 
5.  A large part of this increase is attributable to the change in the Canadian-U.S. dollar exchange rate. 
The per capita expenditure increase for 2003 over 2002, measured in Canadian dollars, was 6.2%. 
 
6.  This author has seen this measure referred to as cost-effectiveness efficiency. 
 
7.  For a fuller discussion of need, see Culyer, A.J., Need, Values and Health Status Measurement and 
Williams, Alan, ‘Need’ – an Economic Exegesis in Culyer (1978). 
 
8.  Since the initial “demand” usually comes from the patient, Mooney (1994) suggests that Supplier-
Induced Need (SIN) is a more accurate term than SID. Although I agree with this subtle 
distinction, SID is widely used in the literature and will be used here.  
 
9.  When opportunity costs associated with time for waiting, travel and recovery are considered, the 
price of service may not be perceived as zero even though there is no out-of-pocket charge at point 
of service.  
 
10.  As with any natural experiment there could be confounding factors. Augurzky et al. (2006) refer to 
the following as potentially confounding factors: the design of the co-payment structure which 
requires a single quarterly co-payment if there is at least one visit to the doctor in the quarter; the 
relatively low quarterly co-payment charge of 10 Euros; and changing patterns of patient 
behaviour involving clustering visits on a single date and packaging prescription drugs into larger 
sizes. 
 
11.  Ideally, the capitation rate used would be set on a needs basis. Given that automobile licenses and 
emission tests can be mandated at regular intervals, why might not annual physical examinations 
and certain diagnostic tests be mandated in order to assess the health status and health needs of the 
population? See Hurley et al (2004) for a discussion of some of the challenges in developing 
needs-based formulae.  
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